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Abstract
Information asymmetry is a necessary prerequisite for testing adverse selection.
This paper applies this sequence of tests to Mauritian slave auctions. The theory of
dynamic auctions with private and common values suggests that when an informed
participant is known to be active, uninformed bidders will be more aggressive and
the selling price will be higher. We conjecture that observable family links between
buyer and seller entailed superior information and find a strong price premium
when a related buyer purchased a slave, indicative of information asymmetry. We
then test for adverse selection using sale motivation. Our results indicate large
discounts on voluntary as compared to involuntary sales. Consistent with adverse
selection, the market anticipated that predominantly low-productivity slaves would
be brought to the market in voluntary sales.
JEL Classification: D 82, N 37
Keywords: Information Asymmetry, Adverse Selection, English Auction, Private
Value, Slavery, Mauritius.
1 Introduction
Information asymmetry is a necessary condition for adverse selection to take place. If
information is symmetric among market participants, then buyers and sellers share a
common information set and competitive markets will ensure that prices correctly reflect
the fundamentals of the object’s ownership. If information is asymmetric, then adverse
selection is possible, but remains to be proven. This suggests a sequential procedure
whereby information asymmetry is tested before adverse selection. We propose to apply
this procedure in the particular context of nineteenth century Mauritian slavery.
Analyzing information asymmetry and adverse selection in slave markets is relevant
for a number of reasons. First, a long-standing view is that slavery was an economically
profitable and thus viable institution. However, if potential adverse selection is not
factored in, the returns on slavery may be over-estimated. Second, given the high degree
of uncertainty associated with purchasing a human being and the imperfections of slave
sales laws (Fede, 1987; Wahl, 1996), the presence of information asymmetry and adverse
selection has long been suspected. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence presented thus far
remains inconclusive. Third, slaves were often sold in public auctions with oral ascending
bids. Observing the behavior of better informed buyers in dynamic auctions can reveal
information to less informed participants and affect their strategies. Moreover, a slave
was often purchased for reasons unrelated to productivity considerations (common value),
such as personal affection or a desire for manumission (private value). Dynamic auction
theory confirms that both elements (open auction and private value) are conducive to
measurable impacts of information asymmetry on bids and equilibrium prices.
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This paper asks (i) how the behavior of better informed bidders might have affected
that of the less informed slave auction participants and (ii) what would have been the
impact of such inter-dependent bidding on slave prices. If we find that the second effect
is negligible, then information was either symmetric or it was asymmetric, but incon-
sequential. On the other hand, if information is found to be asymmetric, then adverse
selection is possible and additional tests can be performed.
We depart from previous analysis in many important ways. First, we use an auction
theory model to derive pricing implications from the active presence of informed bidders
in English auctions with common and private values (Section 3). This model predicts
more aggressive bidding by uninformed bidders when an informed bidder is present which
would consequently force the informed bidder to pay a higher price if he wins the auction.
Moreover, it also predicts that the premium he ends up paying would be independent of
the number of participants. An active informed bidder tends to signal a potentially large
common value and thus induces higher uninformed bids through a loser’s curse effect.
This enthusiasm is however dampened by a winner’s curse effect whereby the informed
bidder may also bid because of a high private value. The model predicts that, for a wide
range of parameter values, the first effect will be stronger than the second. Increasing
the number of participants also increases the probability there will be more high-signal
bidders, and consequently higher prices. However, this effect obtains whether or not an
informed bidder is present; the informed bidder premium therefore remains unaffected
when the number of participants increases.
Second, we test for the presence of informational asymmetry using a unique data set
of notarial acts of the auction sales of Mauritian slaves in the early nineteenth century
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(Section 4.1). Importantly, in addition to prices, motivation for sales and slave character-
istics, these data document the identities of the sellers and buyers of slaves. We conjecture
that family ties between the two were publicly known and likely entailed superior infor-
mation for the buyer. Since we do not observe the actual bidding process, we cannot
test for more aggressive bidding in the presence of a related (and better informed) bid-
der. Nonetheless, we can test its direct consequence that a related bidder pays a higher
price when he ends up winning an auction compared to instances where an unrelated
bidder won. Controlling for numerous observable characteristics, we find a statistically
significant premium on the related bidder in succession sales (Section 4.3). Due to data
limitations, the related variable might be measured with error, or could be endogenously
determined. We consequently instrument it with the recorded number of heirs, a variable
which is unlikely to be affected by measurement errors and/or simultaneity. The results
remain qualitatively similar.
Third, having established the presence of informational asymmetries, we then turn to
the issue of adverse selection (Section 4.4). By focusing on the motivation for the sale, we
join a large strand of empirical adverse selection literature in detecting an Akerlof (1970)
lemons’ effect. Hence, a seller with surplus holdings of goods for which he has scant
alternative uses should sell all of his stocks, good and bad quality alike. Conversely, a
seller with alternative uses and low surplus should sell only the low-quality goods, keeping
the high-quality items for himself. To the extent that observable characteristics of the
seller provide information as to which case applies, this culling behavior is anticipated by
the market and the goods he sells voluntarily are discounted.
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In our slavery context, we test for adverse selection by comparing prices in involuntary
(succession) sales with those in voluntary auctions. Again controlling for observable
characteristics as well as the presence of informed bidders, we find that the succession
sales premium is positive and statistically significant. Having shown previously that
information is asymmetric, we may safely conclude that the effect measures residual
adverse selection.
2 Related literature
2.1 Asymmetric information and adverse selection
Our main findings are consistent with an informed bidder inducing more aggressive un-
informed bidding and consequently higher equilibrium prices in slave auctions. Similar
competition-enhancing effects of informed bidding are also obtained in the literature on
asymmetric information in private value auctions. In this case, uninformed bidders in-
terpret the informed bidder’s presence as indicating that either common and/or private
values are high. This significantly reduces the dampening impact of the winner’s curse and
augments the loser’s curse effect. For example, Hernando-Veciana and Tro¨ge (2004) con-
sider English auctions where, in the spirit of Wilson (1998), private and common values
can be observed separately. An insider who perfectly observes common and private values
induces aggressive bidding among uninformed bidders who find it profitable to gamble
that their private value is higher and therefore outbid the insider. In a signal setup simi-
lar to ours where private and common value cannot be distinguished, Hernando-Veciana
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(2008) shows that a bidder acquiring better information on the common value induces
more aggressive bidding by uninformed bidders in open than in sealed bid auctions.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, an opposite competition-dampening effect can also obtain
under a different auction model and set of assumptions. Hence, in the pure common value
environment, Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983) show that the informed bidder never
lets uninformed bidders win at a price less than the common value in static sealed-bid
auctions.1 Consequently, equilibrium expected profits are positive for the informed bidder
but zero for uninformed bidders. Put differently, the winner’s curse is fully operational
and deters uninformed bidders from participating when the informed bidder is active.2
The empirical evidence on common value auctions generally confirms that the winner’s
curse is important and that insider information is valuable. Hendricks and Porter (1988)
find evidence that a strong winner’s curse will have a detrimental impact on drainage
lease prices when better informed bidders are present. Similarly, Hendricks et al. (1994)
find that returns for better informed (less informed) firms are positive (negligible) when
the seller’s reservation price is stochastic.3 In short, although competition dampening
can occur in other environments, our choice of auction model (English auctions) and
assumptions (common-cum-private values) is dictated by the characteristics of the slave
market we analyze and is consistent with the competition-enhancing effect of informed
bidding that we identify.4
1See also Milgrom (1981) for a discussion.
2We numerically verify and confirm the competition-dampening impact of informed bidding in a
special case of our model where private values are on average zero and the informed bidder is perfectly
informed about the common value. This highlights the importance of private valuations in obtaining the
competition-enhancing effects that we identify.
3Hendricks et al. (2003) also confirm that the winner’s curse is empirically important in a sealed-bid
setup with symmetric information. See also Hong and Shum (2002) for evidence of winner’s curse effects
in procurement auctions.
4Although the settings are different, note that a competition-enhancing effect can still obtain in
other pure-common value setups, including one-shot, first-price, with different information specifications
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This paper draws from tests of asymmetric information in other settings. As surveyed
by Chiappori and Salanie´ (2003), this literature tests for residual asymmetric informa-
tion in realized prices while controlling for observable characteristics. The conclusions
on the presence of asymmetric information in different markets (insurance, labor and
financial markets) are mixed and depend of the mechanisms these markets use to obtain
information.5
The paper is also related to tests for adverse selection using observable seller’s char-
acteristics. As suggested by Genesove (1993), the propensity to sell (often proxied by
the reasons for selling) should be inversely related to adverse selection. In a well-known
application, Gibbons and Katz (1991) consider the labor market to test lemons’ effects
in layoffs.6 They compare displaced workers from two sources: voluntary layoffs and
plant closures. As the less informed market anticipates that voluntary layoffs are also
lower skilled workers, the post-displacement wages should be lower for these workers than
for those displaced after a plant closure. Their empirical results confirm this intuition.
Nonetheless, they refrain from concluding that adverse selection is indeed proven because
the market could learn about productivity at the same time as the firm.
2.2 Adverse selection in slave markets
Whether or not informational asymmetry and adverse selection were indeed present in
slave markets does matter to the extent that not taking it into account may bias evalua-
(Campbell and Levin, 2000), multiple units, second-bid (Hernando-Veciana, 2004), or repeated first-price
(Ho¨rner and Jamison, 2006) settings.
5For example, automobile insurers often make efficient use of risk classification to mitigate asym-
metric information in their portfolio. The evidence is less conclusive in testing for residual asymmetric
information in labor markets.
6Other applications of this framework are found in the markets for used cars (Genesove, 1993) and
for thoroughbred yearlings (Chezum and Wimmer, 1997) among others.
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tions of the profitability of slavery. A prevailing view is that slavery was an economically
profitable institution that would have remained viable in the absence of exogenous in-
tervention such as anti-slavery legislation or the Civil War (Conrad and Meyer, 1958;
Fogel and Engerman, 1974; Fogel, 1989). However, in the presence of adverse selection, it
becomes hazardous to infer the productive capacity of the general slave population from
the market prices of slaves who might actually be inferior ones culled by their owners
(e.g. Greenwald and Glasspiegel, 1983; Choo and Eid, 2004, among others).
Although adverse selection is likely to have been present in slave markets, the empirical
evidence concerning its incidence remains inconclusive. Studying the New Orleans market
for local and imported slaves, Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983) rely on the origin of the
slave as an observable seller characteristic to gauge the degree of adverse selection. They
conjecture that owners from low-productivity areas (e.g. Old South, or Border States)
would have had a higher marginal propensity to sell and therefore little or no interest in
keeping only the best slaves and selling the low quality ones. In comparison, owners from
high-productivity states (e.g. Louisiana) would cull low-productivity slaves for resale
purposes. Consequently, prices for imported slaves would be higher than for local slaves
in anticipation of that behavior. Their empirical results, as well as those of Choo and
Eid (2004), confirm this intuition.
However, Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) criticize the argument that higher prices
for imported slaves reflected adverse selection. First, they maintain that one setting in
which adverse selection ought to be minimized was that of estate sales where assets (in-
cluding slaves) were liquidated following the death of the owner. In comparison, voluntary
sales should be more subject to the practice of culling bad slaves and should therefore
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exhibit lower prices. Yet, they find no statistically significant difference between prices
observed during estate and voluntary sales. They conjecture that higher prices fetched
by imported slaves on the New Orleans market simply reflected the fact that they were
of higher quality compared to local slaves and did not result from an adverse-selection
discount applied against local sellers.
3 Theoretical analysis
3.1 An auction model with an informed bidder
One theoretical setting which is particularly well suited to our empirical analysis is the
open-bid, single-good, ascending English auction model, with private and common values
and asymmetric information across bidders. This framework is useful in that bidders can
learn about the quality of the object during the bidding process and can change their
reservation prices (Milgrom, 2004; Maskin, 2004).7
Wilson (1998) considers a specific case of English auctions introduced by Milgrom and
Weber (1982) and labeled as the button (or Japanese) auction in which the dropping-
out decision is both public and irrevocable. Under the joint assumption of log normal,
multiplicative values and information asymmetries, the equilibrium strategies are log-
linear and can be computed as a function of the chosen parameters. Hong and Shum
7In the presence of interdependent values, Maskin (1992) shows that an equilibrium with one-
dimensional signals can still be efficient in ascending auctions with interdependent values and asym-
metric bidders (different value functions) if interpersonal crossing conditions hold. These conditions are
verified in the Wilson (1998) additive log-normal model (Krishna, 2003, p. 262). When signals are multi-
dimensional, efficiency is no longer possible (for a general proof of inefficiency see Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2001)).
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(2003) consider a generalized version of the Wilson model and their formulation will be
discussed here.
Specifically, agents denoted i = 1, . . . , N are characterized by an unobservable val-
uation Vi and a privately observed imperfect signal of that valuation Xi concerning an
object sold at an ascending, open-bid auction. The valuation of that object is determined
by both a private Ai and a common V component. Each round of the auction consists
in agents submitting bids, with the lowest bid being dropped out and a new round being
started. At each round k, agents can observe the signal of the exiting bidder, but need to
infer that of the N − k other bidders who remain active. Given price P , the equilibrium
bidding strategy βki of agent i at bid round k must satisfy:
P = E[Vi | X1 = (βk1 )−1(P ), . . . , XN−k = (βkN−k)−1(P ), XN−k+1, . . . , XN ], (1)
for i = 1, . . . , N−k. Under general monotonicity conditions, it can be shown that such an
equilibrium exists and is obtained by solving (1) for the N − k inverse bidding functions
(βkN−k)
−1(P ) (Hong and Shum, 2003, Proposition 1, p. 331).
Importantly, it is possible to derive closed-form expressions for the Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium bidding functions when the stochastic process is log-normal. Assume that
log valuation vi ≡ log(Vi) and log signal xi ≡ log(Xi) are distributed as follows:
vi = ai + v, (2)
xi = vi + i, (3)
[ai, v, i] ∼ N.I.D.
(
[a¯i,m, 0] ,Diag
[
t2i , r
2
0, s
2
i
])
.
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The valuation for each agent vi in (2) is the sum of private value ai and common value
v; the signal xi in (3) is a noisy measure of that valuation. Private and common value as
well as noise are assumed to be i.i.d. Gaussian with ti (r0) being the standard error of the
private (common) value and si that of the signal error. All the distributional parameters
{a¯i,m, ti, r0, si} are public knowledge. It can be shown that the equilibrium bid of agent
i at round k satisfies:
bki ≡ log(βki ) = 1/Aki (xi +Dki xkd + Cki ), (4)
where xkd is the ex-post observable vector of signals from exited bidders and where
Aki , D
k
i , C
k
i are functions of the distributional parameters a¯i, ti,m, r0, si (Hong and Shum,
2003, eq. (12), p. 334). This model is convenient for analyzing the impact of the presence
of an informed bidder on equilibrium bids. An informed bidder, i = I, could be thought
of as one whose signal is precise compared to others:
si = 0 if i = I, and si > 0 if i 6= I. (5)
Combining (5) and (3) implies that only the informed bidder I is able to observe his
own valuation directly, i.e. xi = vi for i = I only.
8 Note that this is not equivalent to I
observing the common value, as ai and v are not individually identifiable in (2). Rather,
perfect information on v by I obtains under two special cases of the model. First, a similar
outcome of xI = v would obtain under the pure common-value models (ai = 0,∀i) in
the spirit of Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (1983), or Hendricks and Porter (1988). Second,
8Recall that the distributional parameters are known and, consequently, that the identity of the
informed bidder (sI = 0) is publicly known.
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Wilson (1998) assumes a diffuse prior (corresponding to r0 = ∞) whereby each agent
separately observes his own ai and v + ei. In this case our informed trader assumption
sI = 0 would then be tantamount to I observing the common value. However, because we
focus on a market for human beings, the pure common value and diffuse prior assumptions
– whereas undoubtedly reasonable in other settings – both appear excessive in our case.
First, assuming away private value for slaves is excessive. Private valuation is usually
associated with differences in cost structures, matching synergies or tastes across bidders.
Empirical evidence suggests that private values are not negligible.9 All of these factors
behind private valuation were certainly applicable to slave auction participants, but per-
sonal feelings towards slaves were also very likely. Evidence of these can be found in
the fact that numerous slave purchases were made for reasons unrelated to productivity
motives such as manumission, keeping slave families together or on a particular estate.
Consequently we follow a large branch of auction theory in allowing ai 6= 0 in our model
to accommodate private valuation.
Second, it would seem doubtful that experienced slave owners, who constituted the
bulk of auction participants, would have completely uninformative priors on a slave’s
common productivity. Moreover, it would seem reasonable to expect that common and
private valuation would be intertwined and not separably observed. Evaluation of a slave’s
productivity could very well be influenced and distorted by personal feelings toward that
slave and vice versa.
9Hong and Shum (2002) provide evidence of strong private value components in procurement auctions
for road and bridge construction and maintenance.
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An analytical evaluation of the effect of restriction (5) is complicated by the nonlin-
earities in the distributional parameters found in Aki , D
k
i , C
k
i in (4). Alternatively, we
may resort to numerical approaches to which we now turn.
3.2 A Monte-Carlo Experiment
To ensure the independence with respect to parametric choices, we stochastically generate
all of the model’s distributional parameters at each replication (see Appendix A.1 for
details) and verify and confirm the robustness to the other parameters in Appendix A.2.
Specifically, for agent i = 1, . . . , N active in bidding round k = 1, . . . , N of the
Monte-Carlo experiment replication j = 1, . . . T , we define pˆi(i, k) ≡ Median(pi(i, k, :)) as
the median of the difference between all agents’ bids with b1(i, k, j) and without b0(i, k, j)
informed bidder:10
pi(i, k, j) ≡ b1(i, k, j)− b0(i, k, j), ∀i, k = 1, . . . , N, ∀j = 1, . . . , T. (6)
Figure 1 plots the median premium pˆi(i, k) against the bidding round number k. The
identities i for some bidders are indicated.11 Moreover, the round number where I retires
is a random event in the simulations since the distributional parameters are drawn at
each replication. We evaluate the median retirement round for the informed bidder at
10More precisely, for each replication j consisting of a given set of parameters θj = {a¯i, ti,m, r0, si}j
and draws for the stochastic shocks j = {ai , v, xi}j , we compute two equilibrium bidding strategies:
one where an informed bidder i = I, si = 0 is present to get b1(i, k, j) and one where the informed is
replaced by an uninformed bidder i 6= I, si > 0 who is otherwise identical to obtain b0(i, k, j) for all
bidders i and all bidding rounds k. We then subtract the second from the first to obtain the excess bid
in (6).
11Recall that bids are re-sorted at each round in descending order. The bidder’s identity should be
interpreted as his position in the sorted bids. Hence, for N = 30 participants, bidder i = 17 at round
k = 5 is the 17th highest bid of the remaining N − k = 25 bidders.
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Figure 1: Median informed bidder premium. Each line corresponds to the median in-
formed bidder premium Median(pi(i, k, :)), where pi(i, k, j) is given in (6) and the premium
is calculated for each agent i = 1, . . . , 30, and at each round k.
round 18 out of N = 30. We observe that, for all agents, the median informed bidder
premium remains strictly positive until round 18. Specifically,
Result 1 The median informed bidder premium is positive until the median retirement
round where the informed bidder retires from the bidding process.
For those high-value bidders remaining after I has left, the premium is negative and
becomes negligible as we approach the end of the process; for medium- and low-value
bidders, the premium is positive until they retire. Furthermore, the premium for the
highest bidders are similar in shape and decline with the intensity of the bids. In addition,
for median- and low-value bidders, the premium increases until they retire. Finally, the
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premium is largest for the lowest bidders who retire early on in the bidding process
(located to the left of the graph).
In ascending auctions such as the ones considered here, the equilibrium price is equal
to the second highest bid in the next-to-last bidding round (Wilson, 1998). Consequently,
a corollary of Result 1 is that, if I remains active until the end to win the auction, then
the second highest bidder will also bid more aggressively and I will end up paying a higher
price. To verify this claim, we therefore compute the equilibrium price (informed-bidder)
premium conditional on I winning the auction:
pi(i = 2, k = N − 1, j | I = 1, k = N, j)
≡ b1(i = 2, k = N − 1, j | I = 1, k = N, j)− b0(i = 2, k = N − 1, j) (7)
This corresponds to the difference in price the informed bidder would have to pay given
that he ended up winning the auction. Panel A of Figure 2 plots the distribution of the
equilibrium price premium.12 It clearly indicates that the premium is non-negative, with
a mean of 0.0663. This allows us to conclude that:
Result 2 The equilibrium price (informed-bidder) premium (7) is positive when the in-
formed bidder wins the auction.
The more aggressive bidding when the informed bidder I remains active arises from
the interaction of the winner’s curse and the loser’s curse. The fact that I remains
12In our Monte-Carlo experiment, the informed bidder won the auction (i.e. b1(I = 1, k = N, j)) a
number TI = 418 times out of T = 5, 000 replications. Selecting only those 418 replications, we therefore
compute the second highest bid b1(i = 2, k = N − 1, j | I = 1, k = N, j) with the informed bidder being
present and winning the auction. Then, for the same set of parameters, we replace the informed bidder
by an uninformed bidder who is equivalent in all other respects to compute b0(i = 2, k = N − 1, j) and
its associated premium (7), i.e. the difference between the two. Figure 2 plots the distribution of those
418 cases.
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Figure 2: Distribution of equilibrium price premium conditional on I winning the auction.
The equilibrium price premium (7) is the second highest bid premium pi(i = 2, k =
N − 1, j | I = 1, k = N, j), conditional on the informed bidder winning the auction.
A. Benchmark case, N = 30, bidders, sI = 0; B. Imperfect information sI = 10
−3 ×
min(s), N = 30. C. N ∼ U [10, 50] stochastic; D. N ∼ U [30, 50] stochastic; E. N ∼
U [10, 50] stochastic and N0 = 1/2N if I absent.
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Table 1: Median equilibrium prices and premium conditional on I winning the auction
b0 b1 pi nb. obs.
A. Benchmark: N fixed
1.9869 2.0649 0.0004 418
B. I imperfect info
1.9092 1.9989 0.0006 409
C. N ∼ U [10, 50] stochast.
1.8383 1.8973 0.0013 490
D. N ∼ U [30, 50] stochast.
2.1058 2.1748 0.0003 339
E. N ∼ U [10, 50] stochast., endo
1.7093 1.8842 0.0988 501
active could be because of a high common value. Then, an uninformed bidder retiring
from the auction incurs a loser’s curse. However, I could remain active because of a
high private value. Remaining active therefore implies the risk of a winner’s curse. Our
results indicate that, for a wide range of parametric specifications, the loser’s curse effect
is higher, such that bidders are willing to bid more aggressively knowing that the informed
bidder remains active.
Panels B-E of Figure 2 plot various robustness checks for Result 2. The corresponding
sample medians are reported in Table 1. First, in Panel B, we relax the hypothesis that
the informed bidder has perfect information (sI(j) = 0, ∀j), by allowing for better (but
imperfect) information (sI(j) = 10
−3×min s(j),∀j), i.e. the better but not fully informed
bidder has a 1,000 times lower standard error on his signal xI than does the individual
with the lowest variance in simulation j. The impact on the results is negligible; the
equilibrium-price premium remains positive.
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In Panels C and D, we consider the impact of allowing for a stochastic number of
bidders N by computing the equivalent of the price premium in Panel A, but where N
is drawn randomly at each replication from a uniform distribution U [10, 50] (panel C)
and U [30, 50] (panel D) instead of being fixed at N = 30. As can be seen by comparing
Panels A with C and D, allowing for a random N has no qualitative impact on Result 2.
Increasing the mean value of N by increasing its support to N ∼ U [30, 50] again leaves the
main results unaffected with the mean premium virtually unchanged. We can therefore
conclude that
Result 3 The equilibrium price premium (7) is independent of the number of participants
N .
The informed bidder who wins an auction pays a higher price owing to the more ag-
gressive bidding by uninformed bidders induced by his presence. However the additional
amount he ends up paying does not depend on the number of uninformed bidders. This
result can be rationalized as follows. As the number of participants increases, the prob-
ability of having a bidder with a high signal increases and so does the equilibrium price.
This effect is independent of whether or not an informed bidder is present. Consequently,
the premium (i.e. the difference in the two prices) remains unaffected and is independent
of N .
In Panel E, we again consider a stochastic number of participants N ∼ U [10, 50],
but where it is positively correlated with the presence of the informed bidder I. More
specifically, we draw N at each replication of the Monte-Carlo experiment and halve it
in the absence of I. Although some caution should be exercised in interpreting these
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results, the equilibrium prices plotted in Panel E of Figure 2 are clearly higher, with a
mean value of 0.1860.13
Two interpretations of this result are possible. First, we may argue that (I,N) are
systematically correlated, in that observing I is informative and attracts potential bidders
who were otherwise inactive. Heuristically, equilibrium prices could be affected through
an extensive and intensive effect: more bidders bid more aggressively because of the
presence of the informed bidder. This interpretation would be consistent with the larger
premium observed in Panel E compared with Panel A.
Second, (I,N) may also be positively but unsystematically correlated through the
presence of a third, omitted variable. Hence, a given type of auction in which informed
bidders are more active than otherwise could also attract more potential bidders for
reasons unrelated to informational asymmetry. For example, in our setting, a succession
sale (in which better informed related bidders are most likely active) could attract more
potential bidders wanting to acquire other goods (e.g. furniture, agricultural equipment,
. . . ). As more bidders may induce a potentially more competitive auction, a higher
equilibrium price would obtain in succession sales where I is also more active. This
higher price would be unrelated to informational asymmetry but would be exclusively
caused by the omitted variable.
Fortunately, this is unlikely to be a problem in our estimation for two reasons. First,
in what follows, we focus initially on succession sales exclusively for both our treated (I
13Contrary to all the experiments conducted so far, this one does not involve a given set of parameters
and draws of shocks per replication, for both cases of with and without an informed bidder. Indeed, we
select only half the parameters and shocks for the “without” case and the full set when I is present.
This means that the equilibrium bidding processes are for two different sets of primitives. As such, this
violates the comparative-statics principle used in computing the informed bidder premium. A different
set of players’ characteristics could explain the difference in price.
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present) and control (I absent) groups. That is, compared to other regular slave auctions,
we likely have a larger number of bidders in succession sales, whether or not the informed
bidder is active. Our estimated premium is the excess price in those succession sales
where the informed bidder ended up acquiring the good, compared with succession sales
where an uninformed bidder won the auction. An omitted-variable effect similar to the
one just described is thus fully taken into account and should not affect our results.
Second, in the estimation robustness analysis in Section 5, we refine this analysis by
incorporating slave-lot (a particular seller selling multiple slaves at a given date) fixed
effects. This fixed effect controls for unobserved heterogeneity at the auction level, such as
the weather, output price and/or the number of participants. Heuristically, the number
of bidders may vary across slave lots but not within a slave lot. Our results confirm
that the informational effect of related buyers is maintained when an uncertain N is thus
taken into account.
Summarizing, the theoretical auction model predicts that an informed bidder’s pres-
ence induces more aggressive uninformed bidding (Result 1) and, consequently, a higher
equilibrium price when the informed bidder wins the auction (Result 2), independently
of the number of participants (Result 3). As the following discussion will make clear, we
do not observe the actual bidding process such that Result 1 cannot be tested using our
slave auctions data set. However, we do observe the winning price as well as the identity
of the winning bidder. This provides a basis for testing Result 2 in Section 4. Finally, as
the number of participants is not observed, we cannot test Result 3 directly, but provide
an indirect test in Section 5.
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Data
Although Mauritius remained an important French and subsequently British slave colony
until slavery was finally abolished in 1835, Mauritian slavery has not been as extensively
studied as other slavery institutions. Chenny et al. (2003) show that Mauritian slavery
displayed remarkable parallels with its better known counterparts elsewhere. Valuation of
physical strength, skills and reproductive capacities were just as prevalent as those found
in the Americas. On the other hand, compared to the New Orleans market, the Mauritian
slave market can safely be regarded as purely local, with slave imports effectively banned
by the British. In 1807, 85% of the island’s total population of 78,000 were slaves of
African, Indian and indigenous origins and no external influx of slaves were supplied on
local markets.
The information on the sale of Mauritian slaves is obtained from the notarial acts in
the Mauritius Archives. Our data base was constructed from 580 auctions involving over
4,200 slaves. A more detailed description is presented in Appendix B. Under Mauritian
colonial law, notaries played a key role in the public auctions of slaves (Government of
Mauritius, 1824, Proclamation of July 16, pp 122-125). In particular, notaries certified
the ownership titles of the sellers and subsequently publicized and organized the public
auction. These auctions were conducted as oral (open) ascending bids, following a slave
inspection period. After the auction took place, the notaries recorded transactional in-
formation between the seller and the buyer of the slave, including date, names of parties
involved as well as the slave’s price and observable characteristics.
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In addition, the acts document the reason for the sale of slaves, either voluntary or
involuntary (for instance following the slave owner’s bankruptcy, or death, i.e. succession
sales). In the latter case, the acts also provide a list of heirs. Under the French Civil Code
(adapted for Mauritius under Code Decaen, 1804), following a bankruptcy, all the assets
(including slaves) of the individual or company had to be liquidated through an auction.
Succession laws (also specified in the Civil Code) prescribed that the succession should be
divided among heirs following the death of the owner(s). Complete liquidation of assets
through an auction was automatic whenever a heir was minor, absent or legally ineligible.
Similarly, auction sales would have been organized whenever heirs failed to reach an
agreement concerning the valuation and distribution of the assets among themselves. In
this case, the value of the proceeds from the auction would have been divided among the
heirs.
Table 2 verifies and confirms our sample’s representativeness of the slave popula-
tion in Mauritius by comparing it with the 1826 partial census data from the Greffe de
l’Enregistrement des Esclaves in the Mauritius Archives (Teelock, 1998; Valentine, 2000).
Overall, gender, ethnicity, as well as age distributions by ethnic group in our sample are
quite close to those obtained from the census. We therefore conclude that our sample is
reasonably representative of the general slave population.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the average prices across gender, occupation and ethnic
group. Our main findings may be summarized as follows: (i) female slaves consistently
fetched lower prices; (ii) price differences across ethnic groups are significant, with Creole
(i.e. indigenous) slaves fetching the highest prices; and (iii) premiums are associated with
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Table 2: Comparison with the 1826 Partial Census.
Number of slaves Average age
1826 Census Notarial acts 1826 Census Notarial Acts
Nb. % Nb. % Avg. Std. Dev. Avg. Std. Dev.
All sample 20,467 4,013 25 14.3 28 15.0
Gender
Male 11,671 57 2,724 64 26 14.0 30 14.5
Female 8,762 43 1,521 36 23 14.5 24 15.2
Missing 33
Ethnic group
Creole 10,364 51 2,015 52 17 12.1 19 12.9
Mozambican 5,581 28 995 26 34 10.8 38 9.7
Madagascan 3,666 18 717 19 31 11.3 34 9.9
Indian 669 3 135 3 44 12.6 47 10.4
Missing 424
skilled occupations. These findings are consistent with those of Chenny et al. (2003) for
the 1825-1827 period.
We use the nominal information to construct a “Related” binary index equal to one
when family ties link buyers and sellers.14 The distribution of the links between the buyer
and seller across reasons for sales is reported in Table 4. In our data set, the vast majority
(75%) of auctions took place to liquidate the estate of a deceased person, while only 6.7%
were because a slave owner voluntarily wanted to sell his or her slaves. The remaining
auctions occurred because of bankruptcy (9.9%). We find a link between buyers and
sellers for 1,003 slaves (3,307-2,304). In the case of succession sales, conditional on being
related to the deceased, the widow(er) is the modal buyer. The second group of related
buyers is composed of the former owner’s children. The share of related buyers is lower
in the case of bankruptcies (4.6%) or voluntary sales (12.6%) than in succession sales
(38.5%). In the case of voluntary sales, the modal related buyer is the original owner
14See Appendix B for an example.
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Table 3: Average slave prices are in current piastres (5 piastres = £1 = $4.94US in 1827,
Officer (2001)). A prime-aged field slave is a male of age 15 to 35 who works in agricul-
ture (pioche or other agricultural related tasks). The T-test is for the null hypothesis
that prices for related and unrelated buyers (Panel B), succession and voluntary sales
(Panel C), are equal.
A- Gender, occupation and ethnicity
Ethnic group All ethnic
Gender Occupation Creole Mozambican Madagascan Indian Unknown groups
Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num. Price Num.
Female Skilled 108 2 229 8 106 1 196 11
Laborer 378 64 188 49 298 19 109 13 126 5 274 150
Household 345 203 243 36 354 63 197 23 313 20 325 345
Unknown 246 69 149 17 216 16 111 11 219 14 214 127
All 330 338 201 102 313 106 152 48 255 39 288 633
Male Skilled 427 167 349 155 371 152 131 10 411 59 382 543
Laborer 397 196 298 495 315 237 194 22 238 25 318 975
Household 373 210 305 65 405 71 188 33 311 17 350 396
Unknown 305 70 271 93 310 47 261 12 314 58 294 280
All 387 643 305 808 344 507 193 77 337 159 337 2,194
All Skilled 423 169 349 155 364 160 128 11 411 59 378 554
Laborer 392 260 289 544 314 256 163 35 219 30 313 1,125
Household 360 413 283 101 381 134 191 56 312 37 338 741
Unknown 276 139 252 110 286 63 189 23 295 72 269 407
All 367 981 294 910 339 613 177 125 321 198 326 2,827
B- Related and unrelated buyers
Related buyer Unrelated buyer T-test Premium
Avg. price Nb. of obs Avg. price Nb. of obs
All males
1825-1835 390 512 330 1,221 5.87 18%
1825-1830 442 317 368 884 5.56 20%
1831-1835 305 195 229 337 6.32 33%
Prime-aged field slaves 489 118 373 236 5.95 31%
C- Succession and voluntary sales
Succession sales Voluntary sales T-test Premium
Avg. price Nb. of obs Avg. price Nb. of obs
All males
1825-1835 355 1,598 247 146 9.22 44%
1825-1830 400 1,080 267 117 9.81 50%
1831-1835 259 518 163 29 5.90 59%
Prime-aged field slaves 334 687 231 61 6.58 45%
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Table 4: Related buyers and motivations for sales. Children sold with their mother are
coded as single sale. We exclude group sales of slaves, i.e. heterogeneous bundling of
adult slaves. Other informed buyers include: a creditor, husband of the niece of the
deceased, the notary, the testament executor (fonde´ des pouvoirs).
Reasons for the sale
Link between Voluntary Invol. Unknown Total
seller and buyer Bankrupt. Succes.
Family
Wife 286 286
Husband 9 189 191
Son 1 177 178
Son-in-law 1 76 77
Daughter 69 69
Grand-children 9 9
Nephew and niece 9 9
Brother 3 5 8
Father 8 8
Sister 7 7
Brother-in-law 2 2
Cousin 2 2
Minor children 2 2
Father-in-law 1 1
Mother 1 1
Non-family
Original slave owner 14 7 7 28
The slave 2 4 6
Tenant 3 3
Business partner 7 7
Same last name 3 3 97 2 105
Other 4 4
No apparent link 200 314 1,530 260 2,304
Total 221 329 2,488 3,307
24
himself (14 purchases).15 This highlights a fundamental difference between voluntary and
involuntary sales in our sample. Related buyers (other than original owner) were active in
involuntary sales and mainly absent from voluntary sales. Unrelated buyers were active
in both.
Panels B and C of Table 3 present price differentials for sub-samples stratified by
the type of buyers (related vs unrelated, Panel B) and the type of sales (succession vs
voluntary, Panel C). To obtain a more homogenous slave group, we focus on male slaves
and on prime-aged male field hands.16 The results can be summarized as follows: slaves
bought by related buyers or in succession sales fetched higher prices.
4.2 Methodology
We saw earlier that our data set allowed us to gauge whether or not slave sellers and
buyers were related. Moreover, we showed that the presence of better informed bidders
in public auctions resulted in a higher price being paid by the better informed bidder in
those instances where he wins the auction (Result 2). We now regroup these two elements
to obtain a testable restriction by making the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 Compared to other bidders, a related bidder has superior information on
the slave’s value.
and
Assumption 2 A related bidder’s identity is known by other bidders.
15Note that, as was the case in New Orleans, the original owner could buy back his own slaves
(Freudenberger and Pritchett, 1991). These owners may have decided to buy back the slave given
that the proposed bid was less than their reservation value, or in order to cancel prior sales and return
the purchase price to the buyer.
16Defined as males aged 15-35 working in agriculture (pioche or other agricultural related tasks)
25
The first assumption appears realistic. We saw in Table 4 that the vast majority
of related buyers were either the spouse or children of the deceased owner in succession
sales. It would seem natural to suppose that these bidders would have had sufficient time
to acquire privileged information on the slave being auctioned.
The second assumption is also reasonable. The small size of the Mauritian market,
both in its limited number of participants and geographical concentration, would make
it likely that bidders would have known each other. It is of course entirely possible that
a related bidder would have preferred to hide the informational content of his bidding
strategy by hiring an agent in order to conceal his identity. Again, we do not have
access to the actual bids so that we cannot verify the actual impact of this. Nonetheless,
three elements lead us to argue that it probably would not have affected our results
much. First, from an econometric standpoint, the implications are that our “Unrelated”
variable would have been measured with error (since some related winners would have
been wrongly classified as unrelated). If that classification error were correlated with
the pricing error, then biased estimates would have been obtained. We control for this
possibility below by instrumenting-out the related variable without qualitative changes in
our results. Second, the notary acts we use were legal documents; any misrepresentation
would have implied serious consequences in terms of titles of ownership, guarantees,
compensation in case of emancipation, . . . . A prospective related buyer would have
undoubtedly weighted the cost of a higher price by letting his identity be public against
the costs of mis-representation. Finally, given the small size of the Mauritian market, it
appears doubtful that such hiding strategies would have been successful.
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The direct consequence of combining Assumptions 1 and 2 with Result 2 is straight-
forward. If the related buyer acquires the slave at the end of the bidding process and if
other bidders believe his actions are somehow motivated by a high common value, then
the price paid by the related buyer will be higher, reflecting the informational asymmetry.
More formally, let Is denote whether the winner of the auction for slave s is related
(Is = 1), or not (Is = 0). We are interested in testing if Is has some predictive power for
the winning bid ps ≡ log(Ps). If f denotes some probability function and Xs a vector
of exogenous variables which explain the winning bid, then we say there is no residual
information asymmetry if Is has no predictive power for ps:
f (ps |Xs, Is) = f(ps |Xs). (8)
Assuming a simple hedonic price function we have that:
ps = Xsβ + Is γ + εs. (9)
where β and γ are parameters and εs is an error term. A test of the null hypothesis of
no residual information asymmetry is then simply a test of H0 : γ = 0.
17 Note that this
is a one-sided test. Rejecting the null is consistent with finding asymmetric information;
17One way to apply our test to the Hendricks and Porter (1988) data would be to estimate the hedonic
price (winning bid) function (9) as a function of control variables and a dummy indicating whether the
winner is a neighbor firm or not. This variable would likely have to be instrumented, which is always
the most difficult task when applying this test. In particular, it remains unclear which available variable
is correlated with the probability of being a neighbor, yet is not correlated with the error terms in the
hedonic price function. Two additional difficulties would have to be considered: First, the competition
between the bidders and, second, how to integrate the randomization behavior of the non-neighbors.
A more general test would be to use all the available bids instead of the winning bids only, since this
information is available in their data set.
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however, not rejecting it could still entail asymmetry among unrelated bidders and/or
that the identity of better informed bidders is not public.
However, Is is potentially correlated with the unobservable characteristics of the slave
in which case ordinary least square estimates of the parameters in (9) would be biased.
For example, related bidders could be more present in succession auctions where other
items on sale might have attracted a different set of bidders. Alternatively, Is could be
measured with error. For instance, we rely primarily on family names to construct our
related index; it is possible that related agents with different names could have been
omitted. One approach is therefore to find a valid instrument for Is. Letting Zs denote
the vector of explanatory variables which determine whether the winner of the auction s
is a related buyer and νs an i.i.d. random error term, we have that:
Is = 1 if νs > −Zsθ, and Is = 0, otherwise. (10)
In other words, a related buyer wins the auction if there are net positive benefits for him
or her.
The vector of explanatory variables Zs must contain identifying variables which are
correlated with Is but are not correlated with the error term in (9). The winning bid
should reflect the expected lifetime productivity of the slave. In this case, variables which
do not measure the slave’s productivity and which appear in the notarial act should not
influence the value of the winning bid. One such possible identifying variable is the
number of heirs: ceteris paribus observing more or fewer heirs should not affect a slave’s
productivity. However, if there are more heirs, it is more likely that one of them would
be willing or would have the means to buy the slave.
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For robustness reasons we extend our empirical analysis to the tests for residual infor-
mation asymmetry proposed by Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) and Dionne et al. (2001)
in the context of insurance markets. An adaptation of the Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000)
test means we would have to estimate simultaneously (10) and
ps = Xsβ + ηs.
A correlation between Is and ps given, Xs, would then be equivalent to νs and ηs being
correlated. Moreover, Dionne et al. (2001) point out that (8) is equivalent to:
f (Is, ps |Xs) = f (Is |Xs) f (ps |Xs) . (11)
This additional relationship shows the symmetry in Is and ps of the conditional indepen-
dence in our context. In a parametric formulation of the distribution of winning auction
prices as given by (9), the conditional independence between Is and ps, given Xs, is
obtained when γ = 0 in (9). Nonetheless, the null hypothesis of no residual information
asymmetry can be rejected because (9) is misspecified. Dionne et al. (2001) show that one
way to avoid this problem is to add the conditional expectation of Is as an explanatory
variable in (9). In our case, this means we should estimate:
ps = Xsβ + Isγ + E(Is|Zs)δ + εs, (12)
where E is the expectation operator and δ is a parameter. Again, a test of the null
hypothesis of no information asymmetry can be devised as a test for H0 : γ = 0.
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The control variables in Xs that we include are mainly determined by the availability
of data, existing literature and likely relevance. For slave-specific characteristics, we
expect prices to be increasing and concave in age and lower for female as well as for
handicapped slaves, thus reflecting the valuation of physical strength. Moreover, we
expect that prices will vary across ethnic origin, reflecting adaptability to conditions and
that prices will increase with the skill levels. As for sale-specific elements, the presence
of children sold with their mother should have a positive influence on price. Finally, we
control for quarterly and yearly effects reflecting seasonality in the agricultural activities
of slaves and medium-term fluctuations in output prices.
Since related buyers were found to be mainly absent from voluntary sales, we focus
on succession sales in a first step. We later consider the impact of adding voluntary sales.
From the original sample of 4,286 slaves, we are left with 1,812 sales for which the infor-
mation on all the variables (winning bids, related bidder, slave characteristics, motivation
for sale) is complete and 1,212 cases where, in addition, we have the information on the
number of heirs which is used as the instrument.18 The data omitted from the original
sample was mainly caused by illegible handwriting or acts that were too deteriorated to
be readable. As these were likely purely random events, there is no reason to suspect
systematic under-reporting and sample selection bias.
18Since the owner was, by definition, alive at the time of the auction, the number and identities of
heirs are unlikely to have been listed in voluntary sales, a further reason why we choose to focus on
involuntary sales only.
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4.3 Results
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. We start with the OLS estimates of the
price equation without conditioning on the identity of the buyer in column (1). We then
augment that equation with the Related binary variable in column (2). This variable is
significantly positive.
As discussed in Section 4.2, observing that a buyer is related to the seller could
be correlated with the unobserved characteristics of the slave. Indeed, the Durbin-Wu-
Haussman test rejects the null hypothesis that the related buyer is exogenous with a
value of 10.76 and a p-value of 0.001. We therefore estimate the price equation by 2SLS
in columns (3) and (4), where the number of heirs is used as the instrument. Once again,
a related buyer pays a significantly positive premium. However, given that relatedness
between the buyer and the seller is measured by a binary variable, it may be inappropriate
to use 2SLS. We therefore estimate the system of equation by full information maximum
likelihood (FIML) in columns (5) and (6) without any qualitative change in the results.
Both sets of estimates strongly reject the hypothesis that related buyers pay the same
price as unrelated ones. The test drawn from Chiappori and Salanie´ (2000) also supports
residual information asymmetry in the market. The correlation of the residuals between
the error term of the Probit equation for whether the buyer is related or unrelated and
the error term of the price equation equals 0.0548 with a p-value of 0.0203. The results
obtained by using the specification (12) advocated by Dionne et al. (2001) which are
reported in columns (7) and (8) again indicate that related buyers pay a statistically
significant premium compared to unrelated ones.19
19Due to convergence problems for the DGV specification, the Handicapped variable was omitted from
the price equation.
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Table 5: Determinants of slave prices: Succession sales only. Related is a binary variable
which equals 1 if the buyer and the original slave owner are related. The reference
categories are: skilled workers for occupation; Creoles for ethnicity. Year and seasonal
fixed effects included. Data period: 1825–1834. Robust values of T-statistics reported in
parentheses.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimator OLS 2SLS FIML FIML
Dep. var. Log price Log price Log price Related Log price Related Log price Related
Related 0.056* 0.617* 0.373*** 0.406***
(2.410) (2.354) (3.784) (4.476)
# Heirs 0.022*** 0.072*** 0.072***
(4.329) (5.164) (5.248)
E(Related) 4.153**
(2.873)
Age 0.048*** 0.050*** 0.056*** -0.012* 0.053*** -0.035* 0.089*** -0.035*
(10.931) (11.139) (7.885) (-2.196) (9.071) (-2.262) (6.428) (-2.254)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
(-16.731) (-16.836) (-11.617) (1.791) (-13.340) (1.830) (-9.402) (1.824)
Male 0.093*** 0.094*** 0.096* 0.013 0.097** 0.040 0.200*** 0.041
(3.353) (3.378) (2.385) (0.383) (2.676) (0.414) (3.897) (0.426)
Handicap -0.537*** -0.538*** -1.036** -0.305 -1.112** -5.808 -6.132
(-4.421) (-4.436) (-2.639) (-0.908) (-3.180) (-0.000) (-0.001)
Mozamb. -0.058 -0.067* -0.124* 0.148*** -0.088* 0.443*** -0.561*** 0.445***
(-1.852) (-2.126) (-2.053) (3.639) (-1.975) (3.866) (-3.375) (3.901)
Madag. -0.041 -0.045 -0.076 0.053 -0.066 0.153 -0.222** 0.151
(-1.390) (-1.506) (-1.667) (1.374) (-1.628) (1.390) (-3.278) (1.381)
Indian -0.413*** -0.421*** -0.412*** 0.080 -0.396*** 0.223 -0.777*** 0.216
(-7.006) (-7.048) (-4.781) (1.086) (-5.153) (1.083) (-5.086) (1.047)
Child. ≤ 5 y. 0.242*** 0.242*** 0.269*** -0.048 0.257*** -0.136 0.317*** -0.139
(8.217) (8.218) (5.483) (-1.157) (5.950) (-1.136) (6.628) (-1.156)
Child. > 5 y. 0.389*** 0.388*** 0.356*** 0.034 0.362*** 0.086 0.274*** 0.089
(9.044) (9.039) (5.567) (0.613) (6.286) (0.552) (4.188) (0.567)
Agric. -0.188*** -0.183*** -0.121* -0.099* -0.143** -0.283* -0.065 -0.289*
(-5.980) (-5.820) (-2.256) (-2.360) (-3.225) (-2.417) (-1.295) (-2.473)
House. -0.133*** -0.142*** -0.152* 0.108* -0.124* 0.297* -0.631*** 0.288*
(-3.802) (-4.031) (-2.493) (2.330) (-2.510) (2.305) (-3.441) (2.238)
Const. 5.120*** 5.090*** 4.787*** 0.390*** 4.905*** -0.393 3.570*** -0.381
(59.286) (58.323) (26.751) (3.462) (39.539) (-1.249) (7.573) (-1.211)
Observ. 1812 1797 1212 1213 1212 1212 1212 1212
R2 0.579 0.580 0.421 0.097 . . . .
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Hence, all the tests support Result 2 whereby the presence of a related buyer with
superior information leads to higher equilibrium prices. Based on the FIML point esti-
mates, we can compute the related buyer premium at 23% (0.373/E(Informed)−1), i.e.
a related buyer would have ended up paying close to 1/4th more for a slave, controlling
for slave characteristics and the timing of the sale. This result is indicative of strong
informational asymmetries between the two groups of participants.
Turning to the other variables, it is of interest to note that the additional determinants
of the price of a slave are consistent with priors and/or with the literature. First, the
number of heirs significantly increase the probability that a related bidder will end up
buying the slave. Second, we identify a concave relation between age and price, a strong
discount on female and on handicapped slaves, as well as on non-native slaves.20 All these
elements capture the expected correlation between determinants of physical strength,
acclimation to island and work conditions and productive capacity. Third, the presence of
children increases prices with lower premia on younger children indicating high mortality
and lost output of child-caring mothers.21 Fourth, human capital is valued positively
with significant premia paid for skilled slaves.22
20Similar age-price profiles are found in the U.S. (Kotlikoff, 1979) and Peru (Newland and San Segundo,
1996). Our estimated male premium is the same as the one found for the Southern US by Kotlikoff (1979),
very close to that for Jamaica (12% in 1817, Higman, 1976, p. 192) and close to the lower estimates for
the West Indies (10% to 25%, Ward, 1988, fn. 60, p. 34).
21Benedict (1980); Valentine (2000); Barker (1996) (Mauritius) and Kotlikoff (1979) (New Orleans)
obtain similar results.
22Kotlikoff (1979) for the US, Bergad et al. (1995) for Cuba and Newland and San Segundo (1996) for
Peru also find positive premia on skilled slaves.
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4.4 From information asymmetry to adverse selection
To test for adverse selection, we contrast prices in voluntary with those in involuntary
succession sales. Assuming maintenance costs were similar for low- and high-productivity
slaves, unprofitable slaves would have been put up for sale first. Anticipating this, the
market would have reacted by bidding lower prices. The consequence is that only low-
productivity slaves would have been effectively sold in voluntary sales. We test this
conjecture using two approaches.
First, we follow the non-parametric tests of Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) in
distinguishing prime-aged field slaves aged 15 to 35 who work as laborers (pioche), from
other slaves, in order to reduce heterogeneity. The t-tests for equality of prices between
voluntary and succession slaves are reported in panel C of Table 3. We strongly reject
the null hypothesis that both are equal for the whole sample and also when we consider
the 1825-1830 and 1831-1835 sub-periods. Prime-aged slaves sold during succession sales
earn a premium of 45% compared to those sold voluntarily which is consistent with an
adverse selection interpretation. Our premium is much higher than the insignificant 10%
value computed by Pritchett and Chamberlain (1993) in New Orleans between 1830 and
1860.
However, we also saw in Table 4 that related buyers were more active in involuntary
sales, which could explain why prices were found to be higher. To take this sample-
composition effect as well as observable slave characteristics into consideration, we aug-
ment the pricing equation in Table 5 with a succession sales binary variable and estimate
it over the full sample (voluntary and succession sales). In the spirit of the empirical
adverse selection literature, we can then interpret a positive premium on the succession
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variable as being indicative of residual adverse selection. Moreover, we can interpret a
positive premium on the related buyer’s variable as further evidence of informational
asymmetry, once we control for the type of auctions in which related buyers were active.
Column 1 of Table 6 presents the OLS estimation results.23 First, the related buyer
dummy variable is significant and remains virtually unchanged from the OLS estimate in
Table 5. This confirms that the information asymmetry evidence is robust to accounting
for the type of auction as well as for observable slave characteristics. Second, the suc-
cession sale variable is significant at the 10% level and numerically larger than (but not
statistically different from) the related buyer premium (0.091 vs 0.050). This indicates
residual adverse selection once we control for the differences in types of bidders as well
as observable characteristics. Third and finally, the other estimates remain qualitatively
similar. Overall, the evidence is thus consistent with both information asymmetry and
adverse selection.
5 Robustness checks
Slave prices can be affected by a number of unobserved factors which could lead to biased
estimates if they are correlated with a covariate. One such unobserved factor is the
number of participants in an auction. It might be argued that the presence of more
participants would increase competition in the bidding process and lead to higher prices.
This could imply biased estimates of the Related or the Succession premium if the number
23The OLS was selected over the 2SLS or FIML estimations because of data availability. By definition,
our main instrument for the Related variable, the number of heirs, is absent in non-succession (i.e.
voluntary) sales and we could not identify another admissible variable in our data set that could act
as an instrument. As all the inference was previously found to be robust to accounting for potential
endogeneity, we are confident that the OLS approach is appropriate. Finally, the Succession variable is
unlikely an endogenous variable; the death of an owner shouldn’t be caused by the value of his slaves.
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Table 6: Determinants of slave prices: All sales (voluntary + succession). See description
of Table 5. OLS estimation, with year and seasonal fixed effects included for models (1),
(3)-(5).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Model Base Slave lot Notaries Informed bidder Informed bidder
fixed effects fixed effects participation participation
Dep. var. Log price
Related 0.050* 0.066* 0.052*
(2.419) (2.113) (2.361)
Succes. 0.091* 0.156 0.079 0.073
(1.985) (1.816) (1.762) (1.447)
Presence 0.071** 0.068*
(2.616) (2.522)
Age 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.044*** 0.043***
(9.550) (11.950) (12.763) (8.064) (7.939)
Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-13.317) (-18.218) (-19.656) (-12.257) (-12.156)
Male 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.128*** 0.151*** 0.151***
(4.179) (4.721) (5.199) (4.163) (4.166)
Handicap -0.518*** -0.485*** -0.521*** -0.763*** -0.767***
(-4.378) (-4.165) (-4.706) (-5.298) (-5.309)
Mozamb. -0.074* -0.114*** -0.070** -0.090* -0.088*
(-2.417) (-3.874) (-2.643) (-2.446) (-2.407)
Madag. -0.035 -0.023 -0.026 -0.010 -0.008
(-1.371) (-0.788) (-1.012) (-0.315) (-0.260)
Indian -0.355*** -0.374*** -0.343*** -0.329*** -0.328***
(-4.668) (-6.707) (-6.582) (-3.781) (-3.743)
Child. ≤ 5 y. 0.226*** 0.198*** 0.224*** 0.242*** 0.241***
(8.824) (7.306) (8.530) (7.129) (7.150)
Child. > 5 y. 0.397*** 0.357*** 0.397*** 0.401*** 0.401***
(10.493) (9.759) (11.361) (8.102) (8.094)
Agric. -0.155*** -0.106*** -0.162*** -0.151*** -0.153***
(-6.027) (-3.698) (-6.294) (-5.065) (-5.155)
House. -0.097** -0.039 -0.097** -0.093* -0.098**
(-3.115) (-1.139) (-3.246) (-2.481) (-2.629)
Constant 4.918*** 4.932*** 4.934*** 5.038*** 4.993***
(56.402) (40.000) (61.013) (54.549) (51.083)
Observations 2407 2407 2407 1740 1740
R2 0.583 0.457 0.566 0.563 0.564
Number of groups 343 14
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of participants is correlated with the presence of an informed bidder or with the type of
slave auction (see Section 3.2).
In order to account for such potential biases, the price equation is estimated over
the full sample by using a slave-lot fixed-effect estimator. This estimator controls for
unobserved heterogeneity which is specific to a particular slave auction, such as the un-
observed number of participants. It can safely be argued that the number of participants
may vary across slave lots but not within a lot. As can be seen in column 2 of Table 6,
we find that all of our results are qualitatively robust to accounting for such unobserved
heterogeneity.
Slave prices could also be affected by the identity of the notary conducting the auction.
For instance, certain notaries may specialize in a certain type of slave sales and, as
auctioneers, may be more skilled or work harder at extracting higher prices. This could
pose a problem in obtaining unbiased estimates of the price equation if the identity and
the effort of the notary are correlated with the identity of the deceased, the type of
auction and/or the identity of related potential bidders. To control for such potential
unobserved factors, we incorporate a notary fixed effect in the estimation. Column 3 of
Table 6 confirms that our results are again robust.
In our data set we observe the participation of a related bidder only when he wins the
auction of a particular slave. We do not observe cases where a related bidder may have
participated in an auction which he didn’t win. To control for the unobserved related
bidder presence, we create a variable equal to 1 for the whole slave lot if at least one
related buyer won a bid in this particular lot (group A) and 0 otherwise (group B). We
compare the price of slaves won by non-related bidders across the two groups. It seems
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reasonable to assume that the related winner of an auction was present at all of the
auctions of that particular slave lot and that he may have participated in those other
auctions which (s)he didn’t win. Thus, the prices of slaves won by unrelated bidders in
group A should be higher than the prices of slaves won by unrelated bidders in group B.
Our results in columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 confirm this intuition and give further support
to our findings.
6 Conclusion
This paper tests for information asymmetry and adverse selection in auctions. It shows
that the former can be detected in English auctions through more aggressive uninformed
bidding in the presence of an informed bidder when private values are high. Consequently,
equilibrium prices paid by the latter are higher. Adverse selection can be detected through
the motivation for sale. Involuntary sales imply the forced liquidation of all assets and
prices should be higher compared to voluntary sales under residual adverse selection.
All our estimation results based on the type of bidders confirm that information
asymmetry was important in the market for slaves. Related (and better informed) bidders
did pay a significant premium when they won slave auctions. Moreover, the additional
tests based on the motivation for sales indicate that adverse selection was also important.
Voluntary sales implied strong discounts compared to succession sales.
Applications other than slave markets could use this approach. For example, compe-
tition among bidders in the case of mergers and acquisitions can involve firms that are
better informed about the target’s true characteristics. Analyzing the impact of their bids
on other firms and on the final acquisition cost would prove informative on the extent to
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which adverse selection could affect the market for M&A’s. Competition among bidders
for paintings, fishes, or in any other open ascending auction may also be considered, as
well as competition in other types of auctions under asymmetric information such as the
second price-auction.
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Appendix
A Numerical methods
A.1 Monte-Carlo experiment details
We select a number of participants (N = 30); distribution laws for the fixed parameters
(U(0, 1)); and a number of replications (T = 5000). In accordance with the model, the
error terms are drawn from Gaussian distributions. Then, at each iteration j = 1, . . . T
we:
1. generate the fixed parameters θj = {a¯i, ti,m, r0, si} from U(0, 1);
2. generate the errors process j = {ai , v, xi} from a Gaussian distribution corre-
sponding to the generated scedastic structure in step 1;
3. use (4) to compute the equilibrium bids for each bidder i, at each round k and for
each iteration j, first without b0(i, k, j) and then with an informed bidder b1(i, k, j).
Finally, we compute the informed bidder premium (6) defined as the difference be-
tween all agents’ bids with and without an informed bidder. We subsequently focus
on pˆi(i, k) ≡ Median(pi(i, k, :)) to obtain the desired prediction for the empirical part of
our study. The number of participants is arbitrarily set at 30 (we verify robustness to
that choice below). Moreover, the parameters of the model are generated at each iter-
ation. This ensures that our results are not dependent on a specific parameter set, but
are robust to very general parametric specifications. In addition, we resort to variance
reduction techniques (antithetic variates) to enhance precision. Also, the identity of the
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informed bidder is arbitrarily chosen such that he sometimes wins the auction and some-
times doesn’t. Finally, in Appendix A.2 we check for the robustness of our results by
sequentially changing the number of participants and the distributional laws for the fixed
distribution parameters.
A.2 Robustness check
In Figure 3, we consider comparative statics exercises where we successively change the
assumptions generating the fixed parameters. For this analysis we focus exclusively on
the maximum bid. Since bids are presented in descending order, this corresponds to
pi(1, k, j) ≡ b1(1, k, j) − b0(1, k, j). First, in panel A we increase a¯i → 5 × a¯i,∀i. This
implies that the mean private value component of total value becomes more important
relative to the common value and that the mean total value and signal are also higher.
Conversely, the variances of both value and signal remain unaffected. The impact shifts
the informed bidder premium outwards and raises it. Second, in panel B we increase
m→ 5×m. This results in an increase in the mean common value, with variances again
unaffected. This variable has no apparent impact on our benchmark results. An increase
in a¯i raises the mean levels of high-value bidders more than those of low-value bidders.
In comparison, an increase in m has a uniform effect on all bidders’ mean valuation.
Consequently, the effect on the highest value bidder is greater than in the second case.
Third, in panel C, we increase ti → 2 × ti,∀i, thereby increasing the variance of the
private component of both total value and signal, while means remain unchanged. This
results in lowering the premium, which nonetheless remains positive. Bidders become
more uncertain regarding the informed bidder’s private value; the latter could remain
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Figure 3: Second highest bidder premium: Effects of parameters. The median second
highest bidder premium is Median(pi(i = 2, k, :)), where pi(i = 2, k, j) is given in (6) and
the premium is calculated for the second highest bid i = 2 and at each round k. The
solid line corresponds to our benchmark specification while the dashed line varies one
parameter in turn.
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active because of a large private value which is irrelevant to other bidders, i.e. the
winner’s curse risk is greater. Fourth, in panel D we increase r0 → 2× r0. This raises the
standard error on the common value. This also has a positive impact on the premium,
since agents are more uncertain concerning the mean common value. Any signal inferred
from the informed bidder’s action is therefore more valuable. Fifth, in panel E we increase
si → 2 × si,∀i so as to increase the overall variance of the signals on common value
without affecting the means. This implies that the signals received by agents become less
informative. Consequently the information revealed by the informed bidder’s decision
becomes more significant and the premium increases strongly.24
B Data sources and details
The information on the sale of Mauritian slaves is obtained from the notarial acts in
the General Inventory of Notaries (group NA) filed in the Mauritius Archives located
in Coromandel, Mauritius. We build on the database first introduced by Chenny et al.
(2003) who used the notarial acts for 1825 to 1827. They considered a sample of 152
auctions involving the sale of close to 1,300 slaves. We extend the period covered up to
January 1835, for a total of 580 auctions involving 4,286 slaves in our primary data set.
Even though other auctions were also held over that period, slaves were actually sold
only during those auctions in our sample. These sales were recorded in the notarial acts
of fifteen notaries, most of whom were operating from the capital, Port-Louis.
The notarial acts contain detailed information on each slave’s characteristics. The
slave’s gender was recorded either explicitly or implicitly. For example, the acts written
24See also the discussion on the potential impact of N stochastic and endogenous in Section 3.2.
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in French distinguish between vendu (male) and vendue (female). Moreover, a slave’s age,
known handicaps, presence of children and ethnicity were also reported. Following con-
temporaneous descriptions, slaves’ ethnic groups were classified as being born in Mauritius
(Creoles), or not (Madagascans, Mozambicans and Indians, including Malays). Finally,
we use the occupational classification of Telfair (1830) to characterize a slave’s work.
We aggregate slave occupations into three categories: laborers,25 household slaves,26 and
skilled slaves.27
To better understand how we proceed to classify sales between related and unrelated,
an example might be useful. On July 2nd 1826, notary Dubor (NA 63) auctioned the
estate of deceased sieur Deville, a police commissioner (Commissaire civil et de police)
in the town of Pamplemousses located in the north of Mauritius. Sylvain Chauveau, the
testament executor, is recorded as the seller. The estate consisted of 12 slaves: 2 mothers
with their children (1 and 3 in each case), 2 skilled males (cook and carpenter), 2 female
laundresses, 1 female seamstress and 1 female domestic worker. All the slaves, except the
cook Caramouche and the female domestic worker Zaize, were purchased by the wife of
the deceased sieur Deville. The widow is obviously related to the original slave owner.
Caramouche was purchased by Hypolite Dupery for whom we could not find any link
with either sieur Deville or anyone else mentioned in the notarial act. As for Zaize, she
was purchased by G. Deville. Although the latter has the same last name as the deceased,
(s)he is not mentioned anywhere in the notarial archive as being related to the deceased
25Agriculture: chief gardener, gardener, laborer, marketman, stable-boy, watchman; and sea-related
activities: caulker, fisherman, sailor.
26Baker, cook, innkeeper, laundress, maid, messenger, nurse, seamstress, shoe polisher, tailor.
27Assistant blacksmith, blacksmith, barrel maker, carpenter, carpentry trainee, carter, commander,
locksmith, mason, master carpenter, master mason, mattress maker, nailer, roofer, sack-maker, sawyer,
shoemaker, squarer, stone cutter, stone cutter trainee, sugar-maker.
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slave owner. We code such a sale as the buyer and seller having the same names and
being possibly related.28
28For robustness reasons, we also assumed that individuals with the same last name were unrelated,
without any qualitative change in our results.
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